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West African countries have recently emerged as key players in the formation of a common 
European Union migration policy. As important source and transit countries for some of the 
current migratory flows into Western Europe, the EU and its member states have engaged 
their assistance, or are in the process of initiating the cooperation, in returning unauthorised 
migrants to their countries or regions of origin. This paper examines these developments 
within the framework of „mobility partnerships‟ between the Union and two West African 
countries: Cape Verde and Senegal. The aim of these „mobility partnerships‟ is to facilitate 
circular migration whereby nationals of the signatory states are encouraged to use authorised 
routes as entry for studying, professional or technical training and employment. I will show 
that the decision by the member states to enter into these „mobility partnerships‟ was driven 
by the convergence of two interlinking concerns: EU‟s internal security and stability in West 
Africa;  these  concerns  were  then  channelled  into  the  broadly-defined  task  of  „migration 
management‟. The paper illustrates that, however, the convergence in goals did not result in 
the adoption of a single approach for addressing these concerns. Rather, it will be shown that 
European migration strategy towards Cape Verde and Senegal is defined by two competing 
components – „repressive‟ and „progressive‟ – that instrumentalise very different policy tools 
(i.e. security and development). Whilst currently the repressive instruments are utilised, I will 
argue that the „mobility partnerships‟ possess the potential to increase the leverage EU could 
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Introduction 
 
The rapid ascension of West African countries to the top of European Union (EU) migration 
agenda is a recent phenomenon. Indeed, we can trace the emergence of heightened political 
interest among European political actors for closer cooperation with these countries to the 
early 2000s within the context of the „High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and 
Development‟  (Chou  2006;  Lavenex  and  Kunz  2008).  Organised  by  the  United  Nations 
(UN), the High-Level Dialogue took place in September 2006 with official delegations from 
over 130 countries exchanging views concerning whether and how best to address the nexus 
between migration and development (Martin et al. 2007). The general consensus among the 
participants was that, whilst the discussion was fruitful, „moving beyond talk to mutual action 
was premature‟ (Martin et al. 2007: 7). This was not, however, the consensus shared among a 
group of European countries: since June 2008 the EU has entered into „mobility partnership‟ 
with Cape Verde and negotiations have been underway with Senegal (Council Document 
2008). The aim of these „mobility partnerships‟ is to facilitate „circular migration‟, which is 
broadly defined as „a form of migration that is managed in a way allowing some degree of 
legal [or authorised] mobility back and forth between [the EU and some third countries]‟ 
(European Commission 2007a). This paper identifies the origin and discusses the outlook of 
EU „mobility partnerships‟ with Cape Verde and Senegal. Three questions will be answered: 
What is the European migration strategy towards Cape Verde and Senegal? How and why 
was this EU approach given preference? What does the engagement with these two West 
African states within the European migration framework reveal to us about the effectiveness 
of the policy tools that the Union has at its disposal?  
 
The main argument advanced in this paper is that these current „mobility partnerships‟ must 
be understood as the result of European migration officials exercising a first-mover advantage 
in a policy field where several ministries – foreign and development ministries – also possess 
competence. The explicit decision by and the success of the European migration ministers to 
capture the development discourse (characterised by technical and financial assistance) have 
determined the co-existence of two distinctive components, which I termed „repressive‟ and 
„progressive‟, inherent within the so-called „partnership‟ between the EU and some sending 
and transit third countries. I argue that the European institutional arrangement concerning the 
„external dimension‟ for transforming the EU into an area of freedom, security and justice 
(AFSJ) has been instrumental in their success: By introducing the „migration-development Chou/EUSA 2009 
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nexus‟ as an overarching framework within which European relationship with developing 
countries should (also) be addressed and then activating their ownership of the „migration‟ 
component, interior officials were able to situate policy elaboration within an institutional 
setting – High Level Working Group on Asylum and Immigration (HLWG) – where their 
legislative dominance has already been established. By showing how the migration ministers 
operationalised the „migration-development nexus‟ into their approach that aims to strengthen 
the EU‟s external borders and safeguard the internal area, whilst facilitating „stability‟ in the 
„threat-sending‟ countries through development assistance, the analysis identifies the role that 
policy entrepreneurs promoting particular ideas play in complex political processes such as 
European integration.  
 
The account concerning the genesis and contours of EU migration strategy towards West 
Africa supports the „garbage can‟ model of political decision-making postulated by Cohen, 
March and Olsen (1972), elaborated by Kingdon (1995) and applied by Guiraudon (2003) to 
explain the „timing, form and content‟ of the European immigration policy domain. The EU 
policy- and decision-making processes concerning the „migration-development nexus‟ exhibit 
characteristics of „organized anarchy‟: problematic preferences among the political actors 
involved in regulating these diverse policy areas, unclear technology concerning the policy 
instruments most appropriate for EU action in West Africa, and fluid participation in the set 
of political actors engaged in determining EU‟s problem-solving capacity in these fields and 
the energy and time they devote to these endeavours (Cohen et al. 1972). Cohen et al. (1972: 
16) argue that „The garbage can process is one in which problems, solutions, and participants 
move from one choice opportunity to another in such a way that the nature of the choice, the 
time it takes, and the problems it solves all depend on a relatively complicated intermeshing 
of elements‟. The aim of this paper is to untangle this complexity intrinsic in the dynamics 
that have driven the EU and its member states to conclude and initiate „mobility partnerships‟ 
with two West African countries. Whilst the analysis provided in the following sections have 
theory-building implications, this paper is explicitly empirically-based.  
 
To develop the argument, the paper will proceed as follows. In the first section, I outline the 
ideational parameters from which „mobility partnerships‟ emerged. Three concepts will be 
discussed: „migration-development nexus‟, „free movement of persons‟ and „EU‟s internal 
and external security‟. The discussion shows how the strategy that the Union and its member 
states proclaimed to embrace in the current „mobility partnerships‟ – i.e. the „comprehensive‟ Chou/EUSA 2009 
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or „global‟ approach – reflects all three ideational elements without giving obvious preference 
to any. This section concludes by showing that, however, the policy instrument now used in 
the  „mobility  partnership‟  between  the  Union  and  Cape  Verde  favours  maintaining  EU‟s 
security  by  ensuring  that  the  „threats‟  associated  with  unauthorised  migration  originating 
from and through West Africa will remain there. To provide an explanation of how and why 
the current „mobility partnership‟ gives primacy to EU‟s security concerns, the next section 
turns to the agents who have been tasked with the implementation of the „global‟ approach 
and the institutional framework within which these preparatory activities occur. By tracing 
when the „migration-development nexus‟ entered into the EU discourse of regulating external 
migration (in the lead-up to the 1999 Tampere European summit), I show how the national 
migration ministers successfully incorporated the development agenda as support for their 
proposed undertakings at a time when tremendous political impetus was given to the AFSJ. 
Put simply, the „window of political opportunity‟ was opened and the EU migration officials 
were present at the scene and pushed forth their policy agenda. In the final section, I examine 
what the analysis concerning the EU migration strategy towards Cape Verde and Senegal tell 




European Integration and the ‘Development-Migration-Security Nexus’  
 
This section discusses how external migration regulation became the policy sector where the 
different EU objectives concerning internal security, controlling the inflow of third country 
nationals and development in impoverished countries could be simultaneously achieved. It 
will be shown that this process has resulted in the formation of a „development-migration-
security‟ nexus in current EU discourse and practice. To do so, I first identify the ideational 
context from which the argument advanced by the EU migration ministers in favour of cross-
sectoral policy cooperation derives its assumptions by unpacking three concepts: „migration-
development nexus‟, „free movement of persons‟ and „EU‟s internal and external security‟. 
Next, I show how the so-called „comprehensive‟ approach that the EU proclaimed to have 
embraced in its migration strategy towards West Africa embodies the ideational elements of 
all three concepts. The emphasis will be placed on the ambiguity inherent within them and 
the contention surrounding their application. Together with the next section, which focuses 
on the institutional setting that contributes to their success, the discussion shows how policy 
entrepreneurs  are  significant  in  situations  where  the  policy  problems  and  solutions  are Chou/EUSA 2009 
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contentious by providing the requisite legislative roadmap that would promote a particular 
combination of ends and means above others.  
 
The connection between migration and economic development in migrant-sending countries 
gained prominence in public policy circles after the publication of the 1990 Ascencio Report 
(1990: Chapter 3). The Report stressed two conclusions: first, „Development, if sustained, can 
eventually reduce emigration pressures‟ and, second, migration also affects development but 
the „relationship is quite ambiguous‟ (Ascencio 1990: 35). By highlighting the ambiguity 
intrinsic in the relationship between migration and development, the Ascencio Report alerted 
the donor states to the notion that the „solution‟ that have long eluded them has always been 
located at the nexus and, to identify it, they simply needed to investigate the various resulting 
implications  to  isolate  the  most  suitable  approach.  According  to  Nyberg-Sørensen  et  al. 
(2002a: 10), who coined the term „migration-development nexus‟, the Ascencio Report was 
responsible for shifting the paradigm concerning how international migration is seen among 
donor countries: it is no longer perceived as the result of „failed development‟ in sending 
countries but instead as an „instrument for development‟. Attention quickly turned to how this 
can be done in practice by examining the „three R‟s‟ of the „migration-development link‟ 
(Nyberg-Sørensen et al. 2002a: 11): recruitment, remittances and return. 
 
Recruitment refers to the stage when the would-be migrants are encouraged by facilitators or 
driven to leave their countries of origin by systemic factors such as poverty, poor governance 
and the lack of employment opportunities. Remittances are the money transferred to the home 
countries and the recipients, often family members, use them to sustain or improve their daily 
lives. Remittances remain the subject of intense political interest concerning the development 
potential of which migrants possess because of their direct effects on local development. The 
World Bank estimated that remittances to developing countries in 2008 may reach US $283 
billion (Ratha et al. 2008: 1), which represents a steady increase from previous years despite 
the current worldwide economic downturn: US $265 billion (2007) (ibid), US $207 billion 
(2006) (The World Bank 2008: 126), and US $167 billion (2005) (Martin et al. 2007: 25). 
The common refrain made in favour of harnessing the development potential of remittances 
asserts that they surpass foreign development aid from donor countries or equal the actual 
foreign direct investment in the developing countries (House of Commons 2004: Chapter 4; 
Lavenex and Kunz 2008: 441-442; Nyberg-Sørensen et al. 2002a: 24). Return completes the Chou/EUSA 2009 
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migration cycle at which the migrant „have saved capital and acquired skills abroad that can 
be productively invested in the sending country‟ (Nyberg-Sørensen et al. 2002a: 12).  
 
Whilst significant advances have been made in identifying the causal relationship between 
migration and economic development (see Gundel 2002; Jazayery 2002; Martin et al. 2007), 
differences remain regarding the most appropriate approach to ensure that a „win-win-win‟ 
scenario – for the migrants, aid-receiving and donor countries – is attained. For instance, 
there are questions concerning whether recruitment should be organised and carried out by 
public  officials  or private actors. Given that remittances  are  private  resources,  the  actual 
impact they have on improving the overall economic situation in sending countries has been 
challenged; studies found that „they tend to go to the better-off households within the better-
off communities in the better-off countries of the developing world‟ (Nyberg-Sørensen et al. 
2002b: 53). Moreover, it has been maintained that if remittances from refugees are used to 
support conflict in the home countries, they may contribute to perpetuating the political and 
economic instability (ibid). Arguments against (large-scale) return have also been raised on 
the basis that this would effectively cut off remittances (ibid); indeed, increased attention has 
been paid to the role that migrant diasporas could play in mobilising economic and political 
support for the home countries. Conversely, highly-skilled migrants who do not return are 
seen as sources of „brain drain‟ for sending countries (see Vinokur 2006). Thus, even though 
there is a growing awareness that migrants are important sources for development in sending 
countries, the „how‟ component of the equation remains hotly debated among all the relevant 
actors. We now consider how this lack of clarity provided European migration officials with 
an opportunity to address their security concerns within the context of realising the AFSJ.  
 
The AFSJ is the current manifestation of the ambition to transform the Union into an area 
without internal frontiers and refers explicitly to a main integration objective: „free movement 
of persons‟. Since European integration began more than fifty years ago, all of the subsequent 
legislative activities revolved around the removal of barriers against the free movement of the 
factors of production, of which the founding members identified four (labour, services, goods 
and capital). The free movement of persons was, however, the last of the four freedoms to be 
addressed because there was disagreement among the member states regarding who would be 
mobile (see Chou forthcoming-b). Simply, whilst some member states  maintain that only 
those persons who are Community nationals may be authorised to move for work purposes, 
other member states assert that all persons who are legally present in the common territory Chou/EUSA 2009 
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may be permitted to exercise mobility (predominantly for work). Since the determination 
over who would be allowed to cross its borders is a defining characteristic of the sovereign 
state,  contention  regarding  supranational  competence  in  the  field  of  external  migration 
remains to this very day.  
 
Yet  the  relaunch  of  European  integration  in  the  mid-1980s  saw  the  emergence  of  a 
compromise  between  these  two  opposing  views  in  the  proliferation  of  intergovernmental 
cooperation within and outside of the Community legal institutional framework for regulating 
internal and external migration. Rather than agreeing on who would exercise free movement, 
the member states instead converged in their respective viewpoints that cooperation should 
proceed on the basis of addressing the potential implications resulting from movement of all 
persons. Put differently, questions regarding internal and external migration regulation have 
been cast as an exercise in maintaining „security‟ in an area without internal frontiers (Geddes 
2008;  Lavenex 2001). Crucially, what  is  entailed by „security‟  has  hardly  been specified 
beyond  the  (primarily  intergovernmental)  exercise  of  threat-designation  and  subsequent 
attempts at its removal or elimination; unauthorised migration emerged early on as one of the 
threats against the security of European citizens. As a result of the member states‟ „agreement 
to disagree‟ concerning how to proceed on the issue of external migration, by the 1980s there 
was a gradual coalescing of preferences around the „security‟ question among the European 
migration officials. 
 
Systemic changes throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s legitimised the ongoing pursuit 
of „security‟. Indeed, the Fall of the Berlin Wall, removal of exit controls in Central and 
Eastern  European  countries,  fragmentation  of  Yugoslavia  and  the  associated  exodus  of 
refugees contributed to the impression that Western European countries were facing a „crisis‟. 
For instance, in 1992 alone EU member states received more than half a million of asylum 
applications,  a  six-fold  increase  from  1982  (UNHCR  2001).  Among  the  member  states, 
Germany was most affected: it received an estimated three million migrants between 1989 
and 1992 (Boswell 2003a: 55). To be sure, whilst these figures appeared to be proportionally 
significant  within  the  European  context,  the  actual  intake  of  asylum  seekers  (i.e.  not 
recognised refugees) in Western Europe represented only a small fraction of all displaced 
persons worldwide. For example, the peak reached in 1992 for asylum requests made in 
Western Europe could be seen as insignificant in comparison to the eighteen million refugees 
scattered throughout the world at the time (UNHCR 1993: figure A). The comparison would Chou/EUSA 2009 
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be even more dramatic if we consider the 1992 recognition rates: 6.5 percent in Spain, 4.5 
percent in Italy and Germany, and 3.2 percent in the UK (Baldwin-Edwards and Schain 1994: 
4). Baldwin-Edwards and Schain (1994: 4) argue that the so-called „“crisis of immigration” 
[was] less a crisis of cross-border flows than it [was] a political crisis of  elite and mass 
reaction to foreign-born people‟. The governing political actors from the mainstream parties 
throughout  the  Union  were  simply  unwilling  or  unprepared  to  confront  systemically  the 
factors that may have contributed to this situation (see Barbou des Places 2003; Joly 1994). 
Hence, it was around this period that we also find, unsurprisingly, the rise of the extreme-
right  parties  that championed  anti-immigration positions  as  the „catch-all‟ solution to  the 
changing migratory flows in Europe (Green-Pedersen and Odmalm 2008; Rydgren 2004).  
 
The growing politicisation of migratory inflows of non-nationals and the ineffectiveness of 
domestic asylum and migration policies at the time gave rise to repeated calls for deepening 
ongoing cooperation at the supranational-level. Consequently, the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty 
„communitised‟ asylum and migration cooperation by extending regulatory competence to the 
other central institutions. In so doing, it added directives and regulations (binding „hard-law‟ 
measures) to the Union‟s policy tool-box for addressing the entry and movement of non-
nationals. This is a highly significant constitutional development because state sovereignty is 
conventionally understood to be closely linked to a government‟s prerogative to decide which 
persons would be admitted and granted permission to reside within its territorial boundary. 
Even though a transition of five years – 1999 to 2004 – had been imposed, during which the 
„intensive transgovernmental‟ style of decision-making (Wallace 2005) was maintained for 
EU asylum and migration cooperation, the decisions by the member states to first pool their 
resources in these two fields and then to extend some regulatory authority to institutions not 
entirely under their control should not be underemphasised. Indeed, especially because the 
Amsterdam Treaty generated great political momentum for advancing asylum and migration 
cooperation that had been generally lacking since European integration began.  
 
In October 1999, the European heads of state and government convened a special summit at 
Tampere, Finland to outline the broad strategy for implementing the asylum and migration 
provisions in the treaty. In their conclusions, they boldly proclaimed that the EU „needs a 
comprehensive approach to migration addressing political, human rights and development 
issues in countries and regions of origin and transit‟ (Council Document 1999b: paragraph 
11). Also, the Tampere conclusions added that the EU‟s comprehensive migration approach Chou/EUSA 2009 
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„requires combating poverty, improving living conditions and job opportunities, preventing 
conflicts and consolidating democratic states and ensuring respect for human rights…‟ (ibid). 
To this end, the Tampere European Council called for „a greater coherence of internal and 
external policies of the Union‟ and isolated the concept of „co-development‟, which shall be 
discussed in the next section, as the guiding principle for this endeavour. These statements 
indicate that the discourse emanating from debates on the „migration-development nexus‟ has 
finally entered the realms of asylum and migration regulation and EU‟s ongoing pursuit of 
internal and external security.  
 
As presented in the Tampere conclusions, the EU‟s comprehensive migration approach did 
not, however, suggest which objectives were to be given preference in practice. For instance, 
if we examine the Tampere goals, we find that the EU‟s comprehensive migration approach 
actually encompasses two distinct strands of thinking that can be characterised as „repressive‟ 
and  „progressive‟.  The  repressive  dimension  refers  to  implementing  measures  applicable 
throughout the EU that primarily benefit the Union at the expense of migrants, countries of 
origin or transit and other private actors. Examples of „repressive‟ measures include visas 
(requiring  non-nationals  to  obtain entry  clearance), carrier sanctions (stipulating  transport 
companies to comply with rules that would co-opt them into removing their passengers who 
lacked the appropriate permission for entry) and readmission agreements or clauses (creating 
the legal possibility to return „unauthorised migrants‟ found in the EU). The migration control 
rationale implicit within the exercise of removing barriers against the „free movement of 
persons‟ and the corresponding goal of maintaining „EU‟s internal and external security‟ are 
thus activated through the „repressive‟ dimension. By contrast, the progressive component 
promotes adopting Union-wide policies that would foster and establish the „win-win-win‟ 
scenario as mentioned above for all relevant public and private actors who might be involved 
in the migration process. Measures falling under this category would contribute to the aims of 
poverty reduction, improving living conditions and increasing employment opportunities in 
the migrant-sending and transit countries. Hence, the logic inherent within instrumentalising 
migration for improving economic development in the sending regions is manifested in the 
progressive component. Whilst consisting of two very distinct – indeed, even competing – 
dimensions, the EU‟s comprehensive migration approach in its original form did not dictate 
which component was to be given preference. 
 Chou/EUSA 2009 
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It became clearer, however, in the adopted legislation and through subsequent developments. 
A substantial portion of the Tampere policies favours the repressive component of the global 
migration approach. For example, the EU had concluded readmission agreements with Hong 
Kong, Macao, Sri Lanka and Albania, and negotiations have been underway with Morocco, 
Pakistan, Russia, Ukraine, Algeria, Turkey and China. Three Council directives had been 
adopted by 2008 to combat irregular migration: mutual recognition of decisions taken by the 
member states to expel migrants, approximation of carrier liability, and conditions for issuing 
short-term residence permits to victims of illegal migration or trafficking who cooperate with 
authorities (see Chou 2008). Concerning asylum, the Dublin Convention for identifying the 
member state responsible for processing asylum claims and the Eurodac system (a database 
containing the fingerprints and biographical details of unauthorised migrants and applicants 
for asylum) have been transposed. Similarly, consensus had been reached on the conditions 
for issuing short-stay visas and the lists of third countries whose nationals required visas to 
enter the EU or were entitled to visa waivers (the so-called black and white lists). As a result 
of  these  developments,  concepts  such  as  „transnationalisation‟,  „extra-territorialisation‟, 
„externalisation‟, „internationalisation‟ and „Europeanisation‟ have been either coined or used 
to refer to this phenomenon (Boswell 2003b; Geddes 2001; 2003; Guiraudon 2000; Haddad 
2008; Lavenex 2006; Lavenex and Uçarer 2004; van Selm 2002).  
 
Yet, to avoid oversimplification, it should be noted that the EU had also adopted several 
measures that cannot be seen as singularly „repressive‟; for example, the Council directives 
on family reunification, approximation of the rights of non-nationals who have the prospects 
of becoming long-term residents, admission of third country nationals for study, academic 
exchanges,  unremunerated  training,  and  for  scientific  research.  However,  of  these  four 
measures, only the Council directives concerning entry conditions for non-EU students and 
researchers  could  be  deemed  to  be  in  line  with  the  „progressive‟  dimension  since  their 
enforcement,  if  it  did  not  lead  to  a  situation  of  „brain  drain‟,  may  contribute  to  poverty 
reduction and job creation in sending regions. It follows that we may conclude that under the 
Tampere programme (operational 1999-2004), the EU‟s comprehensive migration approach 
gives preference to the repressive component. Whilst „mobility partnerships‟ emerged only 
under the current Hague agenda (2005-2010), calls for concluding them with selective third 
countries were made to ensure that the Union would continue to practise its comprehensive 
migration approach after the completion of the Tampere programme. Indeed, as we shall now Chou/EUSA 2009 
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see, the progress achieved thus far confirms that these „mobility partnerships‟ have generally 
followed earlier legislative developments. 
 
Cape Verde and Senegal are the West African countries among the first cohort to conclude or 
negotiate, respectively, current „mobility partnerships‟ with the Union; Moldova and Georgia 
are the other two. In the present pilot project with Cape Verde, the Union has been setting up 
a joint centre at Praia to process short-stay visas and distribute information concerning legal 
migration to and employment opportunities in participating EU member states (in this case, 
France, Spain, Luxembourg, and Portugal) (European Commission 2008b). The Commission 
recommended in November 2008 that the Council start negotiations for visa facilitation (for 
Cape Verdeans wishing to migrate to the EU) and for a readmission agreement that would 
require the Cape Verdean government to readmit its citizens, and any third country nationals 
who have transited through its territory, found to be illegally present in the Union (European 
Commission 2008a). In the case of Senegal, intergovernmental negotiations for establishing 
„mobility partnership‟ have begun in June 2008. According to an official from the permanent 
representation of one of the Scandinavian countries to the EU, however, these talks appeared 
to have discontinued at the time of writing as the result of the Senegalese dissatisfaction with 
what they were to receive in return for EU‟s terms (correspondence dated 17 March 2009).  
 
Whilst it is certainly too early to determine which component of the Union‟s comprehensive 
migration approach would eventually dominate in „mobility partnerships‟ with West African 
countries, the Commission recommendation to conclude readmission agreement with Cape 
Verde and the negotiation stalemate with Senegal do suggest that the repressive dimension is 
again instrumentalised in the first instance. This is hardly surprising given how the approach 
has been used during the Tampere era discussed above. Indeed, this outcome could have been 
anticipated in November 2006 when the Commission gave its own assessment on the „Global 
Approach to Migration One Year On‟. In its Communication, the Commission recommended 
that „once certain conditions have been met, such as cooperation on illegal migration and 
effective mechanisms for readmission, the objective could be to agree mobility packages with 
a number of interested third countries‟ (emphasis added, European Commission 2006: 7). To 
conclude, whilst the EU has been practising its so-called „comprehensive migration approach‟ 
in its proposed „mobility partnerships‟ with Cape Verde and Senegal, the policy instruments 
activated thus far seek to uphold the migration control rationale inherent in the repressive 
dimension of this very approach. To account for this outcome, in the next section we examine Chou/EUSA 2009 
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the discursive, institutional and contextual factors that may have contributed to the decision 





Changing Discourse and the High Level Working Group on Asylum and Immigration  
 
To understand and explain current developments regarding EU‟s „mobility partnerships‟ with 
West African countries, the discussion to follow concentrates first on the change in discourse 
and the institutional decision made during the run-up to the October 1999 Tampere European 
summit for realising the AFSJ. The reason for doing so is because, whilst the comprehensive 
migration approach has been mentioned earlier in the European integration context (Lavenex 
2006), it was during the preparations for implementing the Amsterdam Treaty provisions that 
it crystallised as the strategy for the way forward in the two fields. Before proceeding, it 
should be noted that European Council meetings are ordinarily attended by the EU heads of 
state and government with officials from the foreign ministry even though the focus is on a 
subject in which other ministries may be more specialised. The interior ministers, however, 
did prepare the political agenda that was adopted at the Tampere summit; they met informally 
on 16 and 17 September at Turku, Finland (a month prior) and held parallel sessions with the 
Tampere meeting. Using position papers that were circulated privately among the officials 
tasked  to  secure  the  EU‟s  internal  and  external  borders,  the  analysis  shows  how  several 
member states (migration officials) began to articulate their proposed activities in terms that 
may be familiar to those whose work addresses developing nations. The primary difference 
being that the new discourse prioritised EU migration control objectives above the economic 
development in and political stability of the countries of origin and transit.  
 
This emerging discourse is very significant because it signals and reveals the process through 
which national migration officials seek to establish their „ownership‟ of policy elaboration in 
sectors where the regulation of external migration may be implicated. Put in another way, it 
symbolises the attempt by EU migration officials to penetrate other policy fields in order to 
achieve the objective of strengthening the Union‟s borders. To identify the institutional factor 
that increased the likelihood of their success, we then turn to an examination of the HLWG 
and its legislative role vis-à-vis the „external dimension‟ of European asylum and migration 
cooperation. The discussion shows that the exclusive institutional platform of the HLWG 
gave EU migration officials unprecedented opportunities to formulate policies proposed to Chou/EUSA 2009 
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have been premised on the new discourse – with the result being, as discussed above, the 
activation  of  the  repressive  dimension  of  the  EU‟s  comprehensive  migration  approach. 
Unsurprisingly, the ability to dominate the legislative process does not imply that the policies 
adopted would be effective in terms of achieving the desired objectives when implemented. 
The section concludes by considering how these intentional efforts to control migratory flows 
by the EU member states have contributed to propelling West African countries to the top of 
the candidates list for the first EU „mobility partnerships‟ with developing countries.  
 
To implement the Amsterdam Treaty provisions relevant to external migration regulation, the 
EU and its member states engaged in sixteen months of intense preparation; beginning at the 
June 1998 Cardiff meeting under the British Presidency and culminating at the October 1999 
Tampere European Council summit. During this process, the discourse emerging from the EU 
migration officials converged on the consensus that the „external dimension‟ is significant for 
EU asylum and migration cooperation (see Chou forthcoming-a). Briefly, in this instance the 
„external dimension‟ refers to cooperation with third countries (acquiring their assistance) in 
regulating migratory flows and it was the Austrian Presidency that first outlined the rationale 
and approach to be taken following the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty. Presented in July 
1998, the Austrian „strategy paper on migration and asylum policy‟ first presented a review 
of the results achieved at the EU-level since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty and 
found them unsatisfactory. Explaining its evaluation, the Austrian Presidency argued that the 
„Union is still not able to give accurate information regarding the number of third country 
nationals illegally on the territory of its member states‟ (Council Document 1998: paragraph 
10).  Concluding its  assessment,  the Austrian Presidency proclaimed that  „solutions  could 
only be European‟ and that „Europe will have to solve these problems itself and not expect 
any help from outside‟ (Council Document 1998: paragraph 31). The approach premising on 
a „model of concentric circles of migration policy‟ that it had advocated, curiously, required 
unequivocal assistance from third countries.  
 
The central idea was to set the migration and border control measures of Schengen members 
as the benchmark that other countries would be asked to emulate. The Mediterranean EU 
states and associated countries constituted the next circle and their task would be to upgrade 
their measures to meet Schengen standards. The former Soviet states, North African countries 
and Turkey were seen as the third circle and their objective was to carry out „transit checks‟ 
and  to  „combat  facilitator  networks‟.  The  fourth  and  final  circle  included  China  and  the Chou/EUSA 2009 
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countries in sub-Sahara Africa and the Middle East, which would be requested to address the 
„push factors‟ that first motivate the migrants to leave the region. To ensure compliance, the 
Austrian Presidency proposed that economic aid to third countries be made conditional on the 
readmission of their citizens or any third country nationals found to have transited through 
their territory en route to Western Europe. It then suggested that, to this end, the EU insert a 
„migration clause‟ into all agreements it concludes with third countries. When the Austrian 
strategy paper was leaked in September 1998, the controversial approach it had promoted was 
tentatively abandoned (Gent 2002; Sterkx 2004). What is extraordinary about the Austrian 
proposal was not simply that its method manifests fully the migration control rationale we 
now associate with the repressive dimension of EU‟s comprehensive approach, but also how 
it singled out the important roles that third countries was envisaged to play in coordinating 
supranational migration policies. (Arguably, the roles of non-EU countries are conceptualised 
by the Austrian proposal to be passively implementing the EU‟s request rather than actively 
engaging in its formulation.) Whilst the coercive Austrian strategy was publicly dismissed, 
the „external dimension‟ continued to remain high on the agenda and the intergovernmental 
exchanges in the immediate run-up to the Tampere summit gave it explicit attention. It is 
within these debates that we find the development discourse being articulated by officials 
ordinarily tasked to safeguard the EU‟s internal and external borders.  
 
In its contribution for the Tampere meeting, circulated in July 1999, the French government 
proposed that the EU embrace „co-development‟ for addressing migratory „push factors‟ (de 
Kerchove 1999). The French has already been using l’approche du codéveloppement since 
the 1980s within the context of „assisted return programmes‟. In its original meaning, which 
did not link development with migration issues, „co-development‟ referred to engaging local 
partners in the aid-receiving country to oversee and implement projects or policies for which 
aid had been given. The idea was that the local partners were more likely to have knowledge 
of the situation on the grounds than the donors and, therefore, could adapt accordingly and 
make effective use of the available resources. The French introduced the migration control 
aspect into the „co-development‟ concept when it sought the cooperation of the aid-receiving 
countries in readmitting their nationals who were „illegally‟ present in France. Thus, when 
the French promoted „co-development‟ as the strategy forward for EU asylum and migration 
cooperation,  it was  envisaged that, in exchange for their assistance in  returning  irregular 
migrants,  the  Union  would  contribute to  the economic development  in sending  countries 
through job creation, vocational training or professional exchange (de Kerchove 1999).  Chou/EUSA 2009 
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Similar to the strategy advocated by the Austrian Presidency, the French „co-development‟ 
approach stressed the importance of the „external dimension‟ and the positive contributions 
that third countries could make towards EU migration control. It did not, however, stipulate 
the conditions under which third countries would be encouraged to uphold the EU‟s requests. 
By incorporating „development‟ into its proposal, the French position paper did succeed in 
highlighting the multiple challenges in regulating the entry and movement of non-nationals 
(especially if the migrants are from developing countries). Indeed, it is implicitly suggesting 
that in order to achieve the objective of orderly migratory flows in and out of the EU, cross-
sectoral cooperation is not only desirable; it is essential. Migration regulation is implicated by 
activities in other sectors such as development and, as we shall discuss more extensively later 
in this section, this move is highly instrumental because it represents an effort to investigate 
the causal relationship between migration and the state of economic development in sending 
regions. It should be noted that whilst the idea of „co-development‟ has already been brought 
up at the 1995 Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona, the term has never been used to 
refer to a pan-European strategy that would increase development aid in a way so as to reduce 
migratory pressures (Lacomba and Boni 2008: 130). In a joint statement issued in September 
1999, France and Germany endorsed the „co-development‟ strategy for the way forward in 
EU asylum and migration cooperation (Interior Ministry of France 1999).  
 
The British position paper (dated 30 July 1999) sent to Pekka Jarvio, the Finnish coordinator 
for the Tampere summit, also highlighted the importance of the „external dimension‟ when it 
argued for the adoption of a „global approach‟ in migration regulation. Here, the UK defined 
the global approach as „ensuring fair procedures are in place for the admission and residence 
of third country nationals…dealing fairly with genuine asylum seekers, and discouraging and 
returning illegal and economic migrants quickly to their own countries‟ (Warne 1999). Three 
areas for action were identified. First, Britain argued for an EU-wide strategy that examined 
the „root causes‟ of migration (i.e. identifying the „push factors‟). Here, interestingly, the UK 
appeared to perceive the factors that motivate third country nationals to migrate to Europe to 
be largely fabricated or orchestrated by criminal facilitator networks because it proposed that 
Europol (the European Police Office) survey the scale and nature of human trafficking and, 
together with the member states, devise an action plan on how to „combat‟ this phenomenon. 
Whilst it is commonly acknowledged that facilitators play a role in the migratory process 
(partly as the result of increasingly restrictive measures introduced by European countries to 
limit the entry of non-nationals) (see Koser 2008), the notion of „root causes‟ is often used in Chou/EUSA 2009 
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the literature to refer to factors such as poverty, political instability (in some cases, failed 
states) and the lack of employment opportunities in the countries or regions of origin. This 
observation leads one to question the apparent incongruity between the British discourse and 
proposed action. One response may be that the UK is most interested in EU cooperation 
resulting in reducing or even removing unwanted or unauthorised migrants from its territory 
– a task that is often assigned, at least at the national-level, to the police agency. When we 
continue with the other two proposals outlined in the British position paper, we find further 
evidence to support this proposition.  
 
Second,  the  UK  stressed  that  the  „global  approach‟  must  ensure  that  any  referencing  of 
„individual  asylum cases  to  the ECJ  does  not  greatly lengthen the time taken to  process 
individual asylum applications‟ (ibid). At the time (1998 and 1999), Britain was only second 
to Germany in Western Europe as the main destination for asylum seekers (UNHCR 2001). 
Understandably,  given  the  intense  political  pressures  exerted  by  the  opposition  and  the 
continual media exposure of the asylum issue, the British government was keen to ensure that 
European cooperation did not contribute to rendering the UK into a „soft touch‟ on asylum. 
Third, Britain suggested that partnership with third countries would be fundamental to the 
„global approach‟ if the EU member states aimed to effectively target unauthorised migration. 
The final point reiterates the common topic of concern – irregular migration – among the EU 
migration officials and we find again that cooperation with third countries to be the „solution‟ 
for this policy challenge. In light of its three-pronged strategy, the British reference to the 
„root causes‟ of migration can be seen as an attempt to broaden the sector parameters within 
which  policies  based  on  the  migration  control  rationale  can  be  implemented.  Indeed,  by 
implying causation between the state of (economic) development in the countries of origin 
and  criminal  involvement  in  human  trafficking,  the  British  contribution  to  the  Tampere 
summit is an instance of „securitising‟ development issues and migration (Buzan et al. 1998; 
Huysmans 2006).  Yet not all member states shared the French and British  positions that 
addressing  the  current  state  of  development  in  the  sending  countries  may  be  the  key  to 
reducing the numbers of unauthorised migrants present in the EU.  
 
Whilst acknowledging the importance of the „external dimension‟ in European migration and 
asylum cooperation, the September 1999 Italian contribution focussed instead on the financial 
incentives for member states whose borders are the EU‟s external frontiers (Italian Non-Paper 
1999). Outlining its rationale, the Italian government explained that „a heavy burden is often Chou/EUSA 2009 
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placed upon a group of Member States and in particular upon certain regions in connection 
with significant migration flows, thus affecting their prosperity and social stability‟ (emphasis 
original, ibid). This „imbalance‟, Italy proposed, „should be reduced by substantive financial 
support at European level, following the path of Agenda 2000 Community initiatives‟ (ibid). 
Continuing, Italy argued that a „comprehensive approach in the field of readmission would be 
more productive‟ than encouraging „progressive social, economic development and political 
stability in the countries [or] regions of origin‟ (ibid). The Italian non-paper shed light on a 
key issue that, according to an Council official working on external migration (interviewed 
on 28 March 2006), occupies a substantive portion of Council debates: distribution of funds 
among the member states tasked to carry out „border surveillance‟. Based on its argument, the 
Italian government was far more interested in ensuring that the finite resources to which the 
EU had access would be used in the first instance to redress the social and economic effects, 
as the result of migratory influxes, of those member states most affected by these changes 
before being channelled to third countries, where the EU presumably would be less effective 
at determining the outcomes.  
 
The comparison between the French, British and Italian contributions to the Tampere summit 
revealed that, whilst there was awareness among the EU member states that fostering positive 
economic development and political stability in sending and transit countries could contribute 
to achieving EU‟s objective of orderly migratory flows, there was disagreement concerning 
to what extent this should be given priority. Indeed, the Italian non-paper asserted forcefully 
that the state of development in third countries should be secondary, or even tertiary, to the 
more pressing concerns of the economic prosperity and social stability of member states that 
were most affected by migratory influxes. By contrast, member states converged in their view 
that acquiring the assistance of third countries in readmitting their citizens found to be present 
in the EU without authorisation was highly desirable. As discussed in the previous section, 
the outcome of this preference convergence has been the adoption of supranational asylum 
and migration policies that embody the migration control rationale. Beyond providing an 
account of the intergovernmental exchanges concerning how to implement the Amsterdam 
Treaty provisions, the discussion showed that the national migration officials also began to 
articulate their proposed strategy in terminologies such as „co-development‟ and „root causes‟ 
that are more commonly associated with development policies.  
 Chou/EUSA 2009 
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In so doing, as the „securitisation‟ theorists would point out (Buzan et al. 1998), the migration 
officials „securitised‟ development policies by stressing the negative ramifications of failed 
development in regions of origin on their ability to remove unauthorised migrants from the 
Union and to thwart future attempts. Because they are security experts, the „securitising‟ of 
development policies provided migration officials with the opportunity to position themselves 
in the policy elaboration process in a field where they do not ordinarily exercise competence. 
This paper contends that this discursive formation is significant because it widened the policy 
parameters within which the national migration officials could achieve the key aim of orderly 
migratory flows in and out of the Union. Certainly, this discursive accomplishment does not 
necessarily imply that EU migration officials‟ desired outcomes are automatically or easily 
reached since foreign and migration ministries exercise competence in determining the rules 
regarding development aid (Lavenex and Kunz 2008: 443). Indeed, Boswell (2003b: 631) 
notes that „Commission officials working on external policy and development were reticent 
about cooperating with [Council migration officials]‟ and were „concerned that the [national 
migration officials] was insufficiently sensitive to relations with third countries‟. In another 
instance, examining the lack of securitisation after the events of 11 September 2001, Boswell 
(2007) finds that securitising non-nationals through discourse actually restricted the ability of 
the interior officials to enforce border control – the result of asymmetry between the profiles 
of known terrorists who carried out the attacks and the migrants and refugees who sought 
entry to Europe. Thus, it is a truly remarkable feat that migration officials could even exercise 
leverage on development policies in the first instance – and we now turn to the institutional 
context that had made this possible.  
 
In October 1998, the Dutch government proposed the formation of a „cross-pillar‟ Task Force 
to coordinate all EU asylum and migration policies containing an „external dimension‟ (van 
Selm 2002: 148). Whilst the proposal was presented to the Dutch Parliament in November 
1998 jointly by the Dutch Foreign and Migration ministers, it had already been considered by 
other EU heads of state and government when they met informally on 24-25 October 1998 at 
Pörtschach, Vienna (ibid). The Dutch initiative was formally endorsed by the Justice and 
Home Affairs (JHA) Council on 29-30 October 1998 and by the General Affairs and External 
Relations Council (GAERC) that convened on 9-10 November 1998 (ibid). So, by December 
1998 the HLWG was fully operational with an explicit mandate to „help reduce the influx of 
asylum seekers and migrants into the Member States of the European Union‟ by „analy[sing] 
and combat[ting] the reasons for flight – taking account of the political and human rights Chou/EUSA 2009 
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situation‟ (Council Document 1999a). It is against this backdrop that the different national 
position papers analysed earlier were circulated. To fully grasp the significance of the HLWG 
we need to identify its agents and the implications of their bureaucratic origin on the types of 
policies that they are likely to formulate, adopt and implement. 
 
The HLWG is institutionally situated in GAERC (the Council responsible for policies falling 
under the Common and Foreign Security pillar) even though its members are senior officials 
from member states‟ interior or migration ministries. In practice, European interior officials 
who defend their national positions in the Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and 
Asylum (SCIFA) (the key steering group in the JHA Council) also represent their countries in 
the HLWG. In other words, the HLWG institutional framework allows the interior ministers 
to formulate and adopt European foreign policies if migration regulation is implicated. Based 
on interviews with migration officials at the Permanent Representation of Hungary to the EU 
(interviewed on 11 April 2006), the reason for this „double-hat‟ characteristic is because most 
member states lacked the personnel resources to send different delegates to both HLWG and 
SCIFA; the exception being the UK, which has been comparatively better-staffed. Therefore, 
in this way the HLWG is the outcome of the „logic of practicality‟ at work: the „inarticulate, 
practical knowledge that makes what is to be done appear “self-evident” or commonsensical‟ 
(Pouliot 2008: 258). This institutional peculiarity led van Selm (2002: 151) to remark, „we 
see Third Pillar people talking about Second Pillar subjects, with the aim of doing work that 
is scheduled to fall under the First Pillar‟. Undoubtedly, the EU migration officials circulated 
their position papers for the Tampere summit with the knowledge that they could legislatively 
dominate the policy-making process if the measures in question can be seen as addressing the 
„external dimension‟ of asylum and migration regulation.  
 
The HLWG exerted a formative impact on how the EU would engage third countries in the 
regulation of migration. Van Selm (2002) explains that, interestingly, whilst formulated under 
the broader rubric of „cooperation with third countries‟, its five action plans endorsed by the 
Tampere European Council were drafted without any actual dialogues with the third countries 
concerned. According to the Council Secretariat, the unilateral approach is largely the result 
of the lack of formal diplomatic relations between the EU or the member states with some of 
these third countries concerned; for example, at the time, with Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan 
(Council Document 2000). The unilateral strategy taken by the EU migration officials was 
the source of complaint from Morocco, which, Boswell (2003b: 631) finds, „initially refused Chou/EUSA 2009 
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to discuss the action plan with the EU, expressing consternation that it had not been consulted 
on the proposals‟. We may conclude that for the migration ministers the idea of „cooperation 
with third countries‟ was less centred on how both partners could obtain shared advantage 
and more concentrated on formulating a common EU approach in the first instance, and then 
subsequently enforcing it on the third country „partners‟. When the European heads of state 
and government extended the terms of reference for the HLWG in 2002, they stipulated that 
the HLWG must „propose possible initiatives and measures to obtain the cooperation of third 
countries, [and to do so by] considering all possible instruments‟ (Council Document 2002). 
It is from this context that current „mobility partnerships‟ between participating EU member 
states and two West African countries have been initiated and concluded.  
 
Similar to how the increased salience of asylum in the 1990s had contributed to the European 
member states‟ decision to engage in closer cooperation, West African countries became top 
candidates in the mid-2000s for „mobility partnerships‟ as the result of several interlinking 
factors: first, the intensification of media attention on unauthorised (maritime) crossings from 
North and West African countries for the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla (along the 
Gibraltar Strait, with Ceuta being approximately thirteen kilometres or eight miles away from 
the Spanish mainland) and the Canary Islands to the West. The media interest peaked in the 
Fall of 2005 when hundreds of sub-Saharan Africans and other migrants succeeded in scaling 
the barbed-wire fences that divided Ceuta and Melilla from Morocco; several migrants were 
reported to have been killed in clashes with the Spanish and Moroccan security forces and 
border guards. In response to these developments, the Spanish government strengthened the 
fences with EU financial assistance, and, together with some member states, tasked Frontex 
(the European Borders Agency established in October 2004) to patrol the West African coast. 
Frontex has been authorised to turn back any boats carrying unauthorised migrants suspected 
of making their way to the EU via one of the Spanish outposts. 
 
The increased patrolling of the Gibraltar Strait and the comparatively higher risk involved in 
its crossing contributed to transforming West African countries into the main embarkation 
points for Western Europe (see Carretero 2008). Carling (2007: 3) notes that „Since the turn 
of the millennium, on average about 350 African boat migrants have been intercepted along 
Spanish shores every week. The approximate weekly death toll among these migrants is four 
deaths‟. The higher frequency in which West African countries are now being used as routes 
to Europe must be understood within the context of the EU member states introducing more Chou/EUSA 2009 
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restrictive asylum and migration measures, which in turn narrow the range of opportunities 
that would-be migrants have for legally entering the Union (see Dover 2008). Moreover, it 
should also be noted that these policies have been systematically adopted by the Central and 
Eastern European countries, which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, as part of fulfilling their 
membership criteria. Thus, seen from this perspective and in light of the bureaucratic rivalry 
discussed in this paper, the European engagement with Cape Verde and Senegal is driven by 
a complex set of variables that cannot all be reduced to either „push‟ or „pull‟ factors. In a 
way the very decisions by the member states to tighten their borders, reform domestic asylum 
and migration regimes and adopt pan-European measures to be in line with new objectives 
have all contributed to the ushering in of Cape Verdean and Senegalese officials to the EU‟s 
negotiation tables. It would be incorrect, certainly, to dismiss the „push‟ and „pull‟ factors as 
inconsequential. However, identifying the other factors also at play may assist in mapping out 
the multiple dynamics that drive European integration in external migration regulation and, 
indeed, allow us to begin investigating how they in turn affect EU‟s relationship with third 





‘Mobility Partnership’ as an EU Foreign Policy Tool?  
 
Situating current attempts to engage Cape Verde and Senegal through „mobility partnerships‟ 
in EU‟s attempts to achieve the objective of orderly migratory flows, this paper provided an 
account of the ideational, discursive and institutional factors that have contributed to their 
initiation and shaped their contents. To summarise, EU‟s comprehensive migration approach, 
consisting of two distinct lines of reasoning (i.e. repressive and progressive), has been the 
strategy used towards these two West African countries. Whilst the „mobility partnerships‟ 
are presently in the pilot phase, a comparison of the actual and proposed activities against the 
existing  regime  revealed  that  the  migration  control  rationale  intrinsic  in  the  repressive 
dimension is favoured. This preference has been rooted in the historical transformation of 
these  sovereign  European  countries  into  a  single  market  premised  on  the  notion  of  free 
movement of labour amidst the migratory fluctuations throughout this period. The focus on 
the agents tasked to carry out the removal of internal barriers against mobility showed that 
they agreed that their efforts would be directed towards threat-designation and the subsequent 
elimination of identified threats. It emerged from this exercise that unauthorised migration is Chou/EUSA 2009 
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a threat to the security of European citizens and that cooperation with main sending and 
transit countries is necessary if the goals were to be reached. With this understanding, the 
European migration officials improved the persuasion of their intended undertaking through 
terms that seek to establish the „win-win-win‟ scenario for the migrants involved, EU and the 
countries  of  origin.  However,  it  has  been  shown  that  this  discursive  formation  occurred 
against the backdrop of their decision-making dominance in the policy-elaboration process 
for European asylum and migration legislation containing an „external dimension‟. In this 
concluding section, I will consider what these insights tell us about both the challenges and 
opportunities facing the EU in its efforts to define its role on the international stage.  
 
To begin examining what „mobility partnerships‟ offer to the Union‟s existing foreign policy 
tool-box, it should be noted that it has been cooperating with both Cape Verde and Senegal in 
another capacity: the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP) framework. The aim of 
the „ACP-EC Partnership Agreement‟, more commonly known as the Cotonou Agreement, is 
to improve the economic development and sustain a stable political environment in the ACP 
countries. Interestingly, for this discussion, Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement has already 
stipulated that signatories „take back‟ their citizens „without further formalities‟ should any 
party find the other‟s nationals residing irregularly in its territory. In light of this readmission 
clause in the Cotonou Agreement, we may conclude that the Commission recommendation 
for concluding a separate readmission agreement with Cape Verde points to the challenges in 
praxis. Critiquing existing readmission agreements concluded between the Union and third 
countries, Ellermann (2008) argues that they are unlikely to be effective because of the EU‟s 
„unilateral policy bias‟ that fails to take into account two conditions: (1) foreign governments 
may have a vested interest in their nationals being illegally working and residing in the EU, 
and (2) implementation requires active and willing support from third country officials. The 
analysis given in this paper showed that this rationale still prevails – even in the pilot phase 
of the „mobility partnerships‟. 
 
One of the key challenges facing the EU in the field of external migration regulation is that it 
does not possess competence in determining labour migration policies. Indeed, this was made 
clear in the Hague programme adopted in November 2004. The European heads of state and 
government unambiguously proclaimed that „the determination of volumes of admission of 
labour migrants is a competence of the Member States‟ (Council Document 2004: paragraph 
1.4). The Commission tabled a proposal in 2001 for a Council directive on „the conditions of Chou/EUSA 2009 
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entry and residence of third country nationals for the purpose of paid employment and self-
employed economic activities‟ (European Commission 2001), which was withdrawn by the 
Commission on 17 March 2006 after several Council debates. The reasons for its ratification 
failure were many; but, according to a Commission official working in DG Justice, Freedom 
and Security (interviewed on 23 March 2006), the most crucial factor was Germany‟s refusal 
to negotiate the document. The Commission official explained that the German government 
at the time did not, indeed could not, support the proposal because of the high unemployment 
rate when the draft directive was being negotiated (March-July 2002). Chancellor Schröder 
entered into office in 1998 on a campaign promise to maintain unemployment figure below 
3.5 million during his party‟s term in government: by January 2002 the number surpassed 4 
million. The Commission has since repeatedly attempted to revitalise the debate concerning 
economic migration and in October 2007 it presented the proposal for a Council directive on 
a „single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and 
work‟ in the EU (European Commission 2007b). At the time of writing, the JHA Council had 
held a political debate concerning its scope (Council Document 2009). It remains to be seen 
whether this directive, which needs to be unanimously endorsed by the member states, would 
be adopted by the Council in the coming years. It is precisely from this perspective that 
„mobility partnership‟ with West African countries could prove to be a useful EU foreign 
policy tool. By offering Cape Verdeans and Senegalese, who may be unable to fulfil criteria 
for entry and admission under existing labour migration regimes, the possibility to enter the 
Union through legal means for employment, the „mobility partnerships‟ could fill the current 
EU competence gap in external migration regulation. If so, the „win-win-win‟ scenario for all 
actors involved may not be so elusive after all.  Chou/EUSA 2009 
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